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Summary 
The study focuses on testing the hypothesis that the subsidy system of the Common Agricultural 
Reform 1n 1992 (CAP'92) drove to changes in farm efficiency towards the thereby claimed 
objectives. With sequential applications of semiparametric methods we succeed to identify the 
impact of the direct payments on environmental adaptation, productivity and efficiency before 
and after CAP'92 without restrictive model specifications. We find that the claimed objectives 
of the EU subvention policy were met only partly, but that the CAP'92 was, however, a step 
forward. Our case study uses large Spanish data sets of animal orientated farms. 
This paper applies non parametric methods for policy evaluation at firm level. The study focuses 
on testing the hypothesis that the subsidy system of the Common Agricultural Reform in 1992 
(CAP'92) drove to changes in farm efficiency towards the thereby claimed objectives. We con~ 
centrate here on animal oriented farms, in particular cattle, pig, sheep and goat farms. The cor· 
rect quantification of efficiency and productivity differentials due to CAP'92 is crucial for such a 
policy analysis as different models can easily lead to different conclusions. Using non parametric 
methods we do not need to specify the production function of the farms. With sequential appli~ 
cations of semi parametric methods we succeed to identify the impact of the direct payments on 
environmental adaptation, productivity and efficiency before and after CAP'92 withou~ restric· 
tive model specifications. We find that the claimed objectives of the EU subvention pohcy were 
met only partly, but that the CAP'92 was - at least partly - indeed a step forward in that 
sense. Our case study uses large Spanish data sets of animal orientated farms. This is justified, 
among other reasons, by the relevance of these farms for Mediterranean forest and grazing land 
preservation in Spain. 
1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to exemplify a policy evaluation using non parametric 
methods to assess the European Union agricultural reform of 1992. The study focuses 
on the effects of Direct Payments (DP) on items such as efficiency before and after the 
Common Agricultural Policy reform of 1992 (CAP'92). The general hypothesis to test is 
that DP bias efficiency in different degrees depending of the firm characteristics. Policy 
reform objectives include the small farm protection by facilitation of efficiency increase. 
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274 . C. Murillo, C. San Juan, and S. Sperlich 
Another hypothesis to test is if the reformed CAP succeeded in reaching the objective of 
increasing the efficiency and the environmental orientation of the farms simultaneously. 
The introduction of DP, reinforced strongly by the CAP'92, was actually motivated and 
warranted with its potential impact on efficiency and on environmental adaptation of 
farms. Given the increasing role that DP will play in the future distribution of resources 
to support the farmers of the European Union, a quantitative framework to measure the 
degree of distortion due to the subsidy policy is highly relevant. 
Clearly, the quantification of the efficiency bias induced by the new policy instruments, 
applied to farms which are heterogeneous in size and taken from regions with divers bio-
physical characteristics, is crucial. Therefore, this will be done in several steps applying 
rather sophisticated (non- and semiparametric) methodology. Further, we have chosen 
Spain as a case study for several reasons; the relevance of animal oriented farms for 
Mediterranean forest and grazing land preservation, the importance of agriculture econ-
omy in Spain, and because of the large number of farms with available accounting data. 
Efficiency and environmental adaptation have become key issues in new European agri-
cultural policy. A step towards an agreement in the \VTO (World Trade Organization) 
and to the decoupling of income from prices was the agreement of the Council of Minis-
ters in June 2003, the Mid· Term Review of the Common Agricultural Politic [CAP MTR]. 
Additionally, the CAP MTR introduces a modulation of the direct payment, for exam-
ple limiting direct payments by size. In view of the new CAP reform which is in force 
since 2005, it would be interesting to look back and study the effects of the previous 
reform CAP'92, especially regarding those aspects tackled by the recent reform like the 
substitution of price support by a single payment. 
We will concentrate on animal oriented farms. As said, for the preservation of large exten-
sions of forest and grasslands in Spain the key farms are those oriented to animal pro-
duction partially based on their own, including rented, land's vegetal output. In fact, the 
Mediterranean forest and the traditional techniques of livestock raising are frequently 
dose to ecological farming. Note that animal density and environmental friendliness are 
strongly related, so we will use these expressions synonymously in the following. In fact, 
the EU defines environmental friendliness via animal density. We will discuss this point 
later in this paper. Under the CAP, especially after the 1992 reform, there was a potential 
contradiction between several policy targets: intervention price reduction and a rise in 
the environmental adaptation of farms and improvement of efficiency. We explore the 
ex-post effects on farms using a data-set of a representative sample of individual hold-
ings. Farm technologies allow for shifting between different proportions of animal and 
vegetal products. 
The current CAP 2003 reform is, in many ways, a step ahead on the basic principles and 
tools introduced in the CAP'92 reform to control over-production by reducing interven-
tion price and to use DP to compensate farmers for their income losses. 
The first step of the recent CAP reform was to introduce direct payments and cut the 
intervention price while trying to reduce intervention stocks. Just to give an idea of the 
importance of DP: currently, due to the CAP, 4.50 million farmers benefit from subsidies 
of 24.8 billion Euros at the EU 15 level. Part of that goes to Spain where 489 thousand 
beneficiaries received 2.98 billion Euros. On average, the farms in Spain receive fewer in 
DP per holding than the average EU farm. Note also that so far, the allocation of direct 
spending among farmers has been known to be unequal in two ways: First, the bulk 
of direct income support is concentrated in a few beneficlaries. For example, the Corn-
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mission acknowledges that in the 2000~01 financial year, only 12.2% of beneficiaries 
r:~ei~ed 69.~1% of all payments in 14 EU1 states. In the case of Spain, 9.3% of bene~ 
fteianes received 59.18% of all payments and 18.43% of the Spanish farmers received 
75.8?%.of DP. This is mainly due to the direct or indirect link of direct payments to eco~ 
nom1~ size. Second, the distribution of direct aid payments among animal type and/or 
crop IS very asymmetrical and is spread over several regulations. The most important 
action under which farmers receive income is the set-aside program and animal premi-
ums .. As a res~lt, the percentage of payments which were directed towards arable crops 
and livestock m the year 2000 amounted to 92.71 and 79.78% of all payments in the 
EU and Spain respectively. With the information available as to the distribution of direct 
income payments by crops, it is easy to contrast the unbalanced distribution for Spain: 
under livestock premiums 185.4 thousand beneficiaries received 974 million Euros while 
for arable crops 373.9 thousand of beneficiaries received 2.013 million Euros. 
For our purposes it is important to point out that the typical holdings with vegetal and 
animal production can collect DP from several programs. We are interested in those types 
of farms because of their potential for cross-compliance. In fact, this type of land manage-
ment provides important opportunities for a trade off between environment preservation 
and gains in efficiency using intensive techniques. The most obvious alternatives are the 
choice in the proportions of animal nutrients cropped or grazed on the farm versus feed-
stuff provided by the industry. There is also the choice between traditional and specialized 
(intensive) livestock breeds. Note that the spread of epidemics is ohen strongly related 
to the ratio of land per animal units. So for example the mad cow outbreak is a result 
of industrial feeding. 
To study these questions, we decided to concentrate on only one country to guarantee 
certain homogeneity and reduce the variance. Note that the CAP has the same principles 
in all of the EU states, so a single country can be interpreted as a case study for various 
EU sates. However, we are aware of the fact that the CAP'92 has some measures which 
differently apply in different Member States and regions. Spain is an interesting case for 
its large size (in surface its 7.2 millions of Ha of grazing lands and 3.4 millions of hectares 
of cultivated lands), export oriented agriculture (more than 55% of exports over the total 
output), with 37.9% of its agricultural output in livestock raising in 2001 (MAPA, 2004 
Anuario de Estadfstica Agraria 2003), and also because of the availability of large data 
samples for each type of animal farming. In 2001, Spain accounted for 14.32% of the 
vegetal output and 11.08% of animal output of the EU15 (Eurostat 2003. European 
Economic Accounts. SEC-95). 
As far as we know, despite of its relevance, few empirical studies counterpoint whether the 
CAP'92 increments in direct payments were attached to better levels in efficiency or envi-
ronmental adaptation, or wether they have decreased the asymmetry between large and 
small holdings, see Bullock and Salhofer (2003). Critics even forecasted a negative incen-
tive to improve productivity and income redistribution (Bryden/1--Iawkins 1992, Bland-
ford!Dewbre 1994, Bureau 2005). Our aim is to analyze the distortions in efficiency due 
to CAP subsidies before and after the CAP'92, and ascertain whether the direct pay-
ments that farmers received actually resulted in more environmentally friendly farming. 
We also address the issue of the relationship between efficiency and size as it is theo-
1 The 15 old Member States except Greece, for which no published data is available. Figures account 
for the directs aids pay to farmers under the Reg. (EC) 1259/1999. Commission, MEM0/02/198 
and AGRI 63569/2002 
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retically unclear whether subsidies allow inefficient holdings to survive or help them to 
catch up the production frontier. A second (hypothetical) scenario (calculating efficiency 
without direct payments) allows us to compare whether (before and after the CAP'92) 
direct subsidies helped farms to reach the efficiency frontier. 
The way of modelling is not neutral ro the results; several papers assume functional 
forms that implicitly accept the existence of constant returns ro scale or no limits for 
the scope of technical change (e.g. Ball et al. 2001, 2007, Jorgenson/Kuroda 1992, Jor-
gcnson/Nishimizu 1978, Jorgenson et al. 1987). For our analysis we always use non- or 
semi parametric methods when (mis-)specifications could provoke serious disturbances 
in our conclusions. This greatly increases the econometric effort as well as the variance 
of our results but avoids any controversy as to the influence of subjective modelling. 
One of our key results shows that, on average, absolute direct payments generally tend to 
increase efficiency (i.e. efficiency in monetary terms) but not productivity (i.e. efficiency 
in physical terms). However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the 
percentage of direct payments rises. So the CAP'03 idea of modulation or capping of direct 
subsidies in the future will potentially increase the efficiency of the public expenses on 
DP. 
Thus, the implications of this work are important for the future application of the recently 
approved CAP Reform 2003 on an historical basis. Applying the CAP reform on "histori-
cal basis" means translating the unequal distribution of subsidies throughout intervention 
prices and direct subsidies into a single payment to each farm. Results can potentially be 
translated into promoting the wrong type of farming, as in past years, for example, the 
conversion of price support into direct payments based on the previous year's level of pro-
tection. Thus potential implications of efficiency will affect agricultural competitiveness 
and have to be carefully analyzed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the data and 
methods we will use for our study. After that we dedicate a large section to the presenta-
tion of the numerical results and their interpretations. Finally, we conclude. Additional 
information about the used data, numerical results and technical details of the procedures 
are given in the appendices of this article. 
2. Data and procedure 
The sample was obtained from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) which pro-
vides homogeneous information for farms and classifies them in types of animal farming 
with positive plant production. We concentrate on cross sectional analysis for the years 
1991, 1992 (before CAP'92 reform) and 1999, 2000 (after CAP'92 enforcement). We 
have chosen these years aiming to have data of average weather conditions and suffi-
ciently delay to allow capturing the changes by the complete enforcement of the reforms 
and farmer reactions to the new policy environment. The FADN survey provides detailed 
information on input expenditures by farm. For the selected farms, livestock production 
(meat an~ animal products) is always greater than plant output (fodder, field crop, grain 
cereals, vmeyards, potatoes, industrial crops, plants, fruits, dried pulses, olive groves and 
others) to. ensure that we only include farms oriented to livestock raising. Plant production 
how~ver Is always positive in the selected sample to ensure that the productioo fuocti?n 
remams homogenous by type of animal farming. We only want to include farms wtth 
similar production functions, e.g. oriented to animal production, but also with the pos-
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sibility o_f harvesting plant products for re-use on the farm or for sale. We consider that 
farms :Vtth no-land (not even rented land) have a non-comparable production function 
and wtll the~efore ?e ex.c~ud:d. For technical reasons when using DEA (Data Envelop-
ment A~alysts) th.e tdentiflcation of an efficiency frontier is only possible if the individual 
produ~t~on functton of the fa~ms is similar: Finally, as we are interested in the impact 
on effiCtency at a farm level, mstead of usmg aggregated data we use individual farm 
accounting data that include any kind of direct payment received. 
y;c define t~c production function of farms with the two outputs and five inputs, listed 
m Table 1, 111 monetary values at the current prices as reflected in the farm accounts. 
Furthe~ details about the data can be found in the appendix, like the specific number of 
farms m each year and the proportion of farms without DP. There are also described 
some of the enumerated variables in more detail. 
Table 1 Variables used in the DEA 
OUTPUTS pbveg plant output 
INPUTS 
pbanim animal output 
capital capital, especially buildings and machinery 
costsg fodder and other animal linked inputs 
costs inputs crop linked (fertilizer, agro-chemicals, seeds, water 
and other crop specific inputs, fuels and lubricants) 
wages salary 
land 
SP 
Agricultural Utilized Area of farm aggregate adjusted for quality 
(thus including pasture and agricultural land adjusted for quality) 
shadow price; the costs for producing without Direct Payments. 
The efficiency cannot be directly observed and must be estimated in a first step by DEA. 
In the Appendix we give a brief introduction to the DEA method explaining in detail 
its exact definition and indicating how it is calculated in practice. We include here some 
useful remarks to understand the basic ideas of the procedure. 
As animal and plant outputs cannot be substituted, we must not aggregate them, but 
estimate efficiency as a two dimensional output problem. There are two reasons why we 
preferred not to consider direct payments as a third output: First, many farms have zero 
subsidies and would thus form a non-interpretable hyper-plane in the DEA; furthermore, 
the subsidies are not actually produced by the inputs considered, so there is no reason-
able argument for allowing them to come along on the left hand side of the production 
function. Alternatively, in DEA, including a variable as output or as negative input will 
give the same interpretation for the efficiency. Moreover, DP as negative inputs can be 
understood as including shadow prices representing the costs paid for not producing in 
a subsidized manner. 
It could be discussed whether more input variables should be allowed to enter into the 
DEA production function, in order to get stronger results with respect to larger differ-
ences in the efficiency index for example. However, this question is nothing more than 
a discussion of the bias - variance trade off: more aggregating leads to more bias but 
less variance and vice versa. We have optr:d here for high resolution, in other words, 
high variance, small bias and thus, none of our results will suffer errors due to possible 
misspecification. 
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Until now we have used the word efficiency for both, economic efficiency and productiv-
ity. For a correct interpretation it will be helpful to distinguish them. This will be done 
as fo1lows. In a first scenario we calculate efficiency with direct payments, in a second 
scenario without. We designate as Ew the efficiency without direct payments which cor-
responds to productivity, and EDP to conventional (economic) efficiency which includes 
direct payments or, in other words, "to crop subsidies" (i.e. producing in a more subsi-
dized way). 
The economic behavior of the farm under CAP is a trade off between the choice of agri-
cultural productions with a certain level of subsidies and other non-subsidized outputs. 
Thus, the differences we see when looking at Ew vs. when looking at Enp indicate the 
level of efficiency distortion on the economic behavior of the farm. Under the current 
multifunction farming, on top of the income for selling on the market, farmers qualify 
for rewards to compensate market failures by pricing positive externalities, So the farmer 
incurs an opportunity cost of not meeting the conditions to receive DP (e.g. minimum 
land per livesrock head). 
We repeat efficiency calculations for two years before and two years after CAP'92, to test 
for whether the CAP reform had promoted efficiency and environmentally friendly prac-
tices. We took always two years to take into account the influence of random weather 
variability (e.g. pasture availability). Furthermore, the sample is divided into type of ani-
mal farming (cattle farming, pig farming, and sheep and goat) as these farms are neither 
uniform in the treatment by CAP nor in the production process. Summarizing: we carried 
out both estimations (with and without DP) for 1991, 1992, 1999 and 2000 for cattle, 
pig, and sheep and goat farms. 
Once the efficiency indices are calculated, we use these results to analyze the changes 
caused by the CAP'92 reform by different methods (corrdations and semi parametric 
regression). Key variables of our study now are the size measured by European Size Units 
(ESU) and a proxy for measuring how environmental friendly (EF) the farm is. As we 
analyze the subsidies policy here, for a fair evaluation, we use the same proxy the EU gen-
erally uses, i.e. livestock unit equivalents per agricultural utilized area, EF = (LU/AUA).2 
The LU/ AUA is used in the European regulation and is generally considered a good proxy 
of the environmental performance of the farm, see also remarks in the Introduction. As 
we mentioned in the introduction, one could also say animal adapted but we use this 
synonymously for environmental adapted because of various reasons, among others: the 
animal density is proportional to the nitrogen production; on average, the extensive farms 
(low animal density) generate positive external economies like the preservation of the 
natural ecosystem. Note that EF is certainly inverse proportional to being environmen-
tal adapted. As the policy faces different targets simultaneously such as productivity, 
cross-compliance, and small farm protection, we need more sophisticated instruments to 
contrast these objectives. 
More specifically, we use two regression models to study the level of compatibility 
between different targets of the new CAP, including environmental adaptation and com-
petitiveness at the farm level. The objective is to quantify the impact on efficiency when 
the CAP'92 increased the direct payments. Our model has efficiency as the dependent 
2 The aggregation of the LU is made with the standard procedure used by FADN and EUROSTAT. 
The variables come from the individual accounting collected under FADN normalization. The 
detailed input and output information of each farm account is fully utilized to calculate the aggrEgate 
variables that include a!! production costs. 
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varia~le and the explicative variable is environmental adaptation, filtering out the regional 
and s1ze effects: 
E = g[ln(El'), ln(ESU)) + fJTR + e, (I) 
whe:e E is ~ir~t economic efficiency Enp (efficiency with direct payments), then con-
ventional effic1ency (productivity in monetary terms) Ew (efficiency without direct pay-
ments). For a more detailed explanation see KleinhanR et al. (2006) where similar methods 
are used t~ough for a different study comparing countries in one subsidy system instead 
of companng systems (before and after the CAP'92) for one country. EF indicates the 
degree of animal density, ESU is the European Size Unit, and R is a vector of dummy 
variables for agricultural region divided into North, Center, Northeast, South and East. 
Recall that we use EF as an inverse proxy for animal adaptation (or environmental friend-
liness, see discussion above). Note that the smaller the EF, the more "environmentally 
friendly" the farm. In the next section it will be seen how the comparison of these two 
regressions (i.e. one with EDP' one without subsidies Ew) helps us to better understand 
the impact of subsidy policy in practice. 
Note that the functiong: IR2 -+ IRis nonparametric, i.e. not specified further. As we will 
see, the impact of ln(EF) and ln(ESU) show strong nonlinearities and severe interactions. 
The term e stands for the not further specified heterogeneity. As g( ·, . ) is non-parametric, 
the logarithm does not impose any model specification here. This transformation is only 
due to smoothing necessities, see Appendix for further details. 
3. Empirical results, interpretation and comments 
3.1. Calculation of efficiency and productivity with DEA 
We first calculate efficiency and productivity with the aid of DEA. These results will 
be used for most of our further conclusions relating them with different economic and 
policy factors. In this sense it is mainly an auxiliary step. As a byproduct, based on these 
results we are also able to check the effect of certain agricultural extension programs 
on efficiency (and productivity). Note that we will not separate the two scenarios (with 
and without subsidies) into two subsections because we are not so much interested in 
the result of each individually but in the differences between them. 
In order to address the question "what are the subsidies related to in practice?" we must 
first clarify the question of modelling. 
The correlation target is to quantify the relationship between productivity (Ew), the farm 
size, the animal density and the fact that the farmer qualify for direct payments. To 
account of both, absolute and relative mean increases, we have estimated the follow-
ing correlations and their p-values: corr(DP, Ew ), corr(ln(l+DP), Ew), corr(DP, ESU), 
corr(ln(l + DP), ln(ESU)), corr(DP, EF), corr(ln(l +DP), ln(EF)). It is conspicuous that 
efficiency calculated with DP will be (positively) related to DP. Therefore we considered 
here only Ew wich we call simply productivity. The numerical results for these correla-
tions can be found in the appendix, Tables A3 to AS, separated only by animal-type. 
For an easier interpretation, let us briefly summarize the signs we see in the tables. In 
Table 2 we have summarized first the pair {corr(DP, Ew), corr(ln(l + DP), Ewl) in the 
280 . C. Murillo, C. San Juan, and S. Sperlich 
first two lines, the signs of the pair (corr(DP, ESU), corr(ln(! + DP), ln(ESU))} in lines 
3 and 4, and of the pair (corr(DP, EF), corr(ln(! + DP), ln(Ef))} in the last two lines. 
Table 2 Signs of correlations: the pair {corr(DP, Ew), corr(ln(1 +DP), EwH 
in lines 1,2; pair {corr(DP,ESU),corr(ln(1 +DP),In(ESU))} in lines 3,4; pair 
{corr(DP. EF),corr(ln(1 + DP), ln(EF))} in lines 5,6. 
cattle pig sheep and goat 
Before CAP'92 0 - 0 - 0 -
After CAP'92 + + + -
Before CAP'92 + + + + + + 
After CAP'92 + + + + + + 
Before CAP'92 0 - +-
After CAP'92 
As to the relation between subsidies and productivity we find that before CAP'92 there is 
no positive impact of subsidies on productivity (Ew), see Table 2. Looking at the effect of 
relative subsidy increase, the impact is even negative. Something similar happens during 
the period following CAP'92, except in the case of cattle farms. However, the impact of 
absolute increase of subsidies on productivity is positive for cattle, and sheep & goat, but 
negative for pig farms after '92. This may support the argument that subsidies improve 
productivity but evidently in a quite regressive way. This means that a combination of 
direct subsidies and economic size (ESU) would be counterproductive. Comparing with 
the numerical results, say levels, given in Tables A3 to AS in the Appendix, we see that 
the relation between DP and productivity (Ewl hardly changes with CAP'92 in any type 
of farm with almost all of them being close to zero. When subsidies rise in relative terms 
we detect significant changes only for cattle farms. 
Turning to the relationship between direct payments and economic size, we see that this 
is always (clearly) positive, see Table 2. This means that no matter whether we measure 
in absolute or relative terms, the policy always benefits the larger farms more strongly. 
This policy did not change with the CAP'92. Looking at the tables in the Appendix, 
the correlations even strongly increase for cattle and sheep & goat after the CAP'92, 
actually over 90% in some cases. In other words, since the CAP'92, the level of subsi~ 
dies can mainly be linked to farm size. That is not surprising since set·aside payments 
and animal premia are related to the area and number of animals respectively. So, after 
CAP'92, direct payment correlation with farm size shows the level of real "modulation" 
of the post CAP'92 subsidies. Thus, our results are congruent with the generally accepted 
hypothesis, see e.g. OECD (2001) and references therein, that direct subsidies are basi· 
cal!y (even if indirectly) linked to output level especially after CAP'92. But therefor it is 
difficult to defend the presumable decoupled characteristic of these aids. Moreover, our 
findings indicate a strong coupling of size and premia since CAP'92 what seems to be 
counterproductive, see the last paragraph. 
Regarding the relationship between DP and EF (recall that the higher the EF the more 
intensively), we see no change of signs for cattle farms (always negative), but some for 
pigs, and sheep & goat farms. There, along the detected signs the relationship between 
subsidies and extensive farming has increased after CAP'92, compare again Table 2. In 
particular, to see more detailed effects of the supporting extensive farm claimed policy 
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target, we compare Tables A3 to AS. Indeed, the results differ somewhat on the measure 
see e.g. Table A4, in_sign ~swell as in the level. Therefore we will use a more sophisticated 
approach to deal With th1s problem {see the following nonparametric regression study). 
In summary, evaluating the policy reform along the targets sketched in the imroduction 
we can say so far that: ' 
• productivity at firm level is indeed biased due to the policy reform. 
• {but) the farms are affected in different degrees by the introduction of DP, depending 
on the type of farm. 
• in p~rticular, productivity is positively correlated with DP in absolute, but negative in 
relative terms. This does not contradict literally the claimed objectives {DP increase 
productivity) but the practice contradicts their spirit {larger farms get more DP what 
is counterproductive). 
• farm size is strongly positively correlated with DP, after CAP'92 more than before, 
what contradicts the idea of helping small farms. 
• environmental friendliness is positively but weakly correlated with DP. 
• the target of supporting extensive farming {i.e. animal adapted farms), we do not find 
as clear a trend as we saw for economic size. 
3.2. A nonparametric regression analysis of the efficiency 
For a further analysis we need to relate the efficiency and/or productivity to size (ESU), 
EF, and regions via a proper regression model. For this purpose we consider now equa~ 
tion (1) with E being EDP (DP included in model) or Ew respectively (DP not included 
in the model). By comparing the results of these two regressions {i.e. using two differ~ 
ent dependent variables), we will sec how the CAP policy distorts the efficiency of an 
individual farm. The estimation procedures applied here are explained in the Appendix. 
First, let us look at the regional effects before and after CAP'92, i.e. the estimates of the 
,8-parameter in regression model (1). We split up Spain into 5 regions: North, Center, 
Andalusia, Ebro (along the Ebro river), and Levante. The last one has been employed 
as a normalizing region. Note that Levante could correspond for "East", and Andalusia 
for "South". Ebro stands for the northeastern Spanish region including the northeastern 
Mediterranean coast and the Ebro river valley both with a chiefly Mediterranean climate 
that traditionally has been conceived them as an homogenous agricultural region. All 
numerical results are given in Tables A6 and A7 of the appendix. 
Before CAP'92 (Table A6): The North was slightly less efficient in cattle farming whereas 
the center is more efficient than other regions. In pig farms as well as with sheep and 
goats, all regions seem to be very close except for the ones in Levante. 
After CAP'92 (Table A?): The North and Ebro regions seem to be less efficient. These 
results arc only insignificant for pig farming in 2000 and in 1999 when looking at Ew 
(productivity). Levante seems to be best for cattle farming, though not significantly bet-
ter than the center and the south. These aspects scarcely alter in both, the model with 
dependent variables Eop and its counterfactual opposite, using Ew· 
These findings might intuitively surprise experts in Spanish animal farming. However, 
there are actually several explanations for these findings. First we must point out that 
in Levante we have less than 10 farms in the sample, which turned out to be technically 
quite advanced holdings (sample effect). Next, it is important to know that even though 
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the North is the so calied "green Spain", the rather poor farms are situated right there in 
the mountains whereas in the center we have hardly cattle farms in mountain areas. This 
is different for sheep & goats. Finally, cattle farms are mainly milk producer, a product 
that has to be processed rapidly (different from meat and wool). It is well known that 
factories (farms in our case) of those kinds of products are in average technically more 
advanced close to huge consumption areas like Madrid. This may also explain why cattle 
farms in the center are in average more productive and efficient. This argument would not 
hold for pig or sheep & goats holdings what is indeed in accordance with our findings. 
Figure 1 Cattle farms in 1991, with dependent variable E0p (left), respectively Ew (right) 
As the functional form of g(·, ·) in model (1) is non-parametric, the results are given 
graphically, see Figures 1 to 7 where we displayed the numerical results for g(., ·).Note 
that g(·, ·)is a three dimensional graph throughout. Along our empirical results, the two 
regressors ln(EF), ln(ESU) unfortunately do not enter additively, i.e. we can not write 
g(ln(EF),ln(ESU)) = gl (ln(EF)) + gz(ln(ESU)). That means, as can be seen in Figure 
1, that it is not enough to look at the purely marginal effects of ln(EF), and ln(ESU) 
respectively, because they have strong interaction. For example, in Figure 1 is plotted 
function g(·, ·) (vertical axis) on its arguments ln(EF), ln(ESU). There we can see that 
for small farms with ln(ESU)"' 1.0 the effect of ln(EF) on efficiency and productivity 
as about 50% stronger than for middle-sized farms with ln(ESU) "' 1.9. For any given 
In(EF) the impact of size is always U-shaped although not symmetric, and the steepness 
of the U-borders changes over ln(EF). 
For ease of presentation we decided not to show the three dimensional graphs but present 
the marginal impacts of ln(EF) (on Enp and Ewl of the median sized (measured in ESU) 
farms (solid line), the large farms (the upper 95% quantile farms with respect to ESU, 
dotted line}, and the small farms (the lower 5% quantile farms, dashed line}. Note that 
when looking at marginal impacts, the single impact of one variable on efficiency can 
be greater than one or also be negative. The three resulting (2 dimensional) functions 
represent three slices of the three dimensional plot. For a better understanding compare 
the three dimensional plot in Figure 1 with its three slices in Figure 2. In all these graphs, 
the outer 2% are cut off (i.e. not plotted) to avoid interpreting the boundary effects. 
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Figure 2 Cattle farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right), Eop on ln(Ef). median sized farms: solid 
hnes; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines 
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Figure 3 Cattle farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), Eop on ln(EF) (upper row), and Ew on 
ln(fF) (lower row). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed 
lines 
Let us have a look at the differences between the regression of Eop compared to the 
regression of Ew· Before the CAP'92 reform {Figures 2, 4, 6) we could not find differences 
between the two regressions, and therefore have given here only the results for Eop· This 
indicates that there was no effect of direct payments on efficiency versus productivity. 
This changes with the CAP'92 reform. For cattle farms (Figure 3) we again obtain the same 
results for the two regressions, whereas for pig holdings the DP now favor the extensive 
and in particular the large holdings (compare Figure 5 left with right side). Since DP do 
not exist per pig head, this is possibly due to DP related to crop and environmental issues 
which would explain that the large farms benefit especially. E.g. Iberian pigs grazing in 
the Mediterranean forest need large plots of land for grazing but are quite profitable 
.~ 
' 
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Figure 4 Pig farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: 
dotted lines; small farms dashed lines 
Figure 5 Pig farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), Eop on ln(EF) (upper row), and Ew on ln(EF) 
(lower row). median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines 
due to the high prices their meat yields on the market. Also for sheep & goat farms, 
we see after the CAP'92 that now including DP in the efficiency changes the regression, 
see Figure 7. For any size of farm it seems that the DP especially favor farms that are 
identified as being intensive holdings (right tail). 
Comparing the results from before with those after the CAP'92 reform we detect that 
extensive farms are not better situated (compared to intensive holdings) in terms of relative 
efficiency levels. Also the efficiency rankings by size remain unchanged by the '92 reform. 
In any case, it is hard to make clear statements because the results vary greatly with 
the years. Focusing only on the median farms, one might say that after the CAP reform 
the efficiency difference between intensive and extensive farms has become smaller. The 
scenario without direct subsidies upholds all our results. 
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Figure 6 Sheep and goat farms in 1991 (left) and 1992 (right). median sized farms: solid lines· 
large farms: dotted lines; small farms dashed lines ' 
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Figure 7 Sheep and goat farms in 1999 (left) and 2000 (right), E0 P on ln(EF) (upper row), and 
Ew on ln(fF) (lower row}. median sized farms: solid lines; large farms: dotted lines; small farms 
dashed lines 
The efficiency of the intensive pig farms is clearly above that of the environmentally 
friendly farms before, and also after the CAP reform. However, after '92 the distance to the 
more environmental friendly farms has also become smaller, i.e. the plotted functions have 
flattened. The scenario ignoring the subsidies when calculating the efficiency, upholds 
these results as well. 
Finally, when looking at the sheep & goat we find the following. Before CAP'92 there 
i:s a dear po:sitive impact of ln(Ef) on efficiency (both, Evr and Ew) for any size of 
farm, whereas this impact becomes strongly U-shaped after CAP.92. This means that 
extensive holdings are now relatively better off than before. However, this statement is 
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only true for small and median sized farms. Furthermore, the rankings by size changed 
after '92 putting the small farms in a better situation than before. In any case, the large, 
intensive farms remain at all times the most productive and efficient ones even though 
these differences narrowed after CAP'92. 
Comparing the results found in the graphs explicitly with the initial hypotheses discussed 
in the introduction, we can summarize that: 
• a distortion of efficiency caused by DP is visible in our plots. 
• there is evidence that less environmentally friendly farms {intensive holdings) are more 
productive and more efficient regardless the DP. 
• however, after CAP'92, for some type of animal farms extensive holdings are a little 
bit better off {relatively to the intensive ones) thanks to DP. 
• the "efficiency and productivity ranking" changes more over the different years than 
when comparing before and after CAP'92. 
• the strong DP ofthe biggest farms cannot be empirically justified with their hypothetical 
above average productivity or low animal density. 
4. Conclusions 
The results clearly show the real difficulties of the reformed CAP in reaching the objec~ 
tive of increasing the productivity {with special focus on the preservation of small farms 
because of the cross~compliance argument) and the environmental orientation of the farms 
simultaneously. The empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between subsidies 
and productivity when looking at the absolute amounts. However, the mean productivity 
decreases or stagnates as the percentage of direct payments rise. This means that a corn~ 
bination of direct subsidies and size is counterproductive. Our results also show that this 
is what the subvention policy after CAP'92 was doing much more than before. The heavy 
subsidization of large farms cannot be justified with their presumably high productivity 
nor environmental friendliness. Neither our graphical nor our numerical results confirm 
the hypothesis that DP, in particular DP per size, encourage productivity or environmental 
friendliness; they may, in fact, even contradict. 
We have found that economies of scale seem to be important before and after CAP'92, but 
we have found several exceptions, see e.g. the pig holdings. The small intensive pig farms 
performed rather well before and after CAP'92. Also the small cattle farms are above 
the mean efficiency index, This reflects the shortcomings of the managers in running the 
farm and solving technical problems when the economic size increases above a certain 
threshold, a finding that concords with Alvarez and Arias (2003). 
After CAP'92 the environmentally friendly hog holdings reach efficiency levels similar to 
those of the most conventional {intensive) farms when accounting for direct payments. 
This was not the case before CAP'92. In contrast, for the cattle farms the order of effi-
ciency between small to big and intensive to extensive farms does not change with DP, 
neither before nor after the CAP reform. For sheep & goats finally, we cannot detect an 
effect of DP before, and only a marginal one after CAP'92. Small extensive farms seem to 
benefit a little bit since the reform what would be in accordance with one ofthe claimed 
objectives. 
However, all together the less environmentally adapted farms are still the most efficient 
ones. Thus, together with the numerical results on correlations, we conclude that there 
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is empirical evidence that the subsidy system after CAP'92 was somewhat more "envi· 
ronmentally oriented" for all types of farms studied than it was before CAP'92. Notice 
further that our results show a significant positive correlation of the DP and EF, i.e. direct 
payment were negatively correlated with animal density, for the years after CAP'92. That 
makes a difference with the situation before the CAP reform where we can not find a 
significant correlation between direct payments and environmental adaptation. 
So the conclusion that the DP structure after '92 played a role in helping farms to preserve 
the natural environment under competitive conditions is empirically supported by our 
results. Nevertheless, we have found also that the DP system introduced by CAP'92 was 
not sufficient to correct the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as 
the big ones are more efficient. Moreover, the empirical results show especially for sheep 
& goat and cattle farming that there is room for improvement of the environmental 
implementation of the CAP. 
Summarizing, our comparison of the situation before with that of after the CAP'92 
reform, cannot lead us to conclude that the claimed objectives would have been reached; 
partly the effects have gone in the right direction, partly not. Neither the small nor the 
more animal adapted farmers benefit from the subsidy policy whereas the large ones 
mainly do. This, moreover is counterproductive what is in contradiction with the claimed 
objectives of the subsidy policy. The changes we have observed for Spain due to the 
CAP'92 are marginal, although visible in some cases, concerning the claimed objectives, 
but strong concerning the non-claimed objectives (e.g. linked to economic size). 
As for the general assessment of the CAP reform it is important to remark that future 
tools must guaranty an effective link between the declared objectives and the ex·post 
results of the policy which is not the case for the analyzed period. In particular, envi-
ronmental adaptation of farms needs to be promoted in a more effective way. The same 
recommendation holds for the promotion of the efficiency for smaller farms, an objective 
systematically repeated and never achieved. 
Finally, the empirical results ask for future research using similar methodology for eval· 
uating the 2003 CAP reform, now on the way to be enforced in the EU Mem~er States. 
Specifically, the complete substitution of the price support by the so called "smgle pay· 
ments" per farm, (which in fact is a single direct payment) will potentially affect in a 
significant way the different types of farm. It will be highly interesting to continue the 
research in this direction once the new data were available. The here used methodology, 
in our opinion, has proven to be rather helpful for such a policy evaluation. It is quite 
flexible, extremely robust against model specifications, and facilitates clear interpreta-
tions. 
Appendix 1: Data and further empirical results 
In T abies Al and A2 are summarized the number of farms used for all our estimations, 
separated by year and animal type. 
In the list of variables used for the DEA, i.e. for calculating the efficiency indices, SP, 
land, and capital arc defined as follows: 
The so called "shadow price" (SP) is calculated from the total a.mount of ~irect. payments 
a farm receives (including premiums), denoted by DP, but w1th a negatt.ve ~tgn: there· 
fore we set SP = -DP. Direct payments include any amount of cash r~cetved under :he 
CAP or national regulation and not linked to an amount of production (e.g. set as1de 
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Table A1 Number of farms used for all our calculations 
'91 '92 '99 '00 
sheep and goat 391 373 553 679 
cattle 2230 1787 1435 1543 
pig farming 126 161 255 249 
Table A2 Number and percentages of farms used for all our calculations not receiving direct 
payments 
in absolute numbers in percentages 
'91 '92 '99 '00 '91 '92 '99 '00 
sheep and goat 82 35 0 0 21.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 
cattle 1373 1198 439 230 61.6 67.0 30.6 14.9 
pig farming 72 66 22 17 57.1 41.0 8.6 6.8 
payments, livestock premia, etc.). Capital input includes machinery, transport equipment 
and structures {not dwellings). For simplicity all animals are treated as variable stock. 
Land is considered as a separate input variable. Land area is adjusted by quality. This 
means that we calculated the value of input "land" by 
land value = sauirr * psauirr + saudry * psaudry , 
where sauirr: Agricultural Utilized Area {AUA) irrigated {Ha.); saudry: AUA non-irrigated 
{Ha.); psauirr: price AUA irrigated by region (Euros!Ha); psaudry: price AUA non-
irrigated by region {Euros/Ha). 
Appendix 11: Methodologies 
Even though these methodologies are not completely new, part of the readership might 
not be familiar either with DEA or with non parametric regression. Therefore we give 
here a brief insight in order to achieve a better understanding and interpretation of the 
results presented later. 
Estimation of (technical) efficiency 
Data envelopment analysis {DEA) is a non-parametric approach for evaluating the perfor-
mance ("the best practice") of a set of peer units called DMUs {decision making units) by 
using linear programming methods. We introduce here some basic concepts of the method 
(see Coopcr/Seiford!fone (2000) for a complete description of the methodology). 
Let us consider an economic sector where firms produce q outputs with p inputs in which 
we may define, following Simar and Wilson {2000)'s notation, the next set of feasible 
input-output combinations: 
'11 = ((x, y) E IRP+q: x can produce y}. (All 
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~ab~e. A3 Correlations for Cattle farms; underlined indicates not 
stgmftcant at 5% level 
Cattle '91 '92 '99 '00 
corr(DP. fwl -0.023 0.050 0.011 0.135 
corr(ln(1 + DP), Ewl -0.158 -0.059 0.110 0.090 
corr(DP, ESU) 0.100 0.254 0.657 0.616 
corr(ln(1 + DP),In(ESU)) 0.024 0.085 0.226 0.164 
corr(DP, EF) -0.012 -0.115 -0.127 -0.181 
corr(ln(1 + OP),In(fF)) -0.079 -0.166 -0.185 -0.196 
Table A4 Correlations for Pig farms; underlined indicates not sig-
nificant at 5% level 
Pigs '91 '92 '99 '00 
corr(DP, Ewl 0.011 -0.310 -0.053 -0.146 
corr(ln(1 + DP), Ewl -0.208 -0.460 -0.309 -0.237 
corr(DP, ESU) 0.133 0.309 0.489 0.168 
corr(ln(1 + 0P),In(£5U)) 0.110 0.298 0.119 0.028 
corr(DP, EF) 0.301 -0.196 -0.089 -0.143 
corr(ln(1 + OP), ln(fF)) -0.119 -0.114 -0.131 -0.384 
Table A5 Correlations for sheep and goat farms; underlined indi-
cates not significant at 5% level 
Sheep and Goat '91 '92 '99 '00 
corr(DP. Ewl 0.034 -0.048 0.048 
0.092 
corr(ln(1 + DP), Ewl -0.057 -0.160 -0.205 -0.096 
corr(DP. ESU) 0.223 0.298 0.968 0.973 
corr(ln(1 + OP),In(£5U)) 0.099 0.159 0.596 0.571 
corr(DP. EF) 0.014 0.023 -0.082 
-0.086 
corr(in(1 + OP).In(fF)) -0.072 -0.090 -0.127 -0.130 
For any y we specify the input requirement set as 
X(y) = {x E !RP : (X, y) E .V). 
(A2) 
where the input efficient frontier is defined by: 
oX(y) = {x E X(y) : ex ~ X(y) ve < 1) . (A3) 
Efficiency measures for each firm (Farrel\1957) 8(x, y) are then obtained as the following 
maximum contraction of inputs along a fixed ray: 
8(x.y) = inf(B: ex E X(y)). 
(A4) 
Note that in our text 8 is E (Efficiency with or without DP). A value of 8 = 1 means that 
the producer is input efficient while a value of 8 < 1 indicates technical inefficiency and 
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Table A6 Estimates (upper lines) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional effects before 
CAP'92. In 1991 we have neither pig nor cattle farms observed in Levante, the reference region 
is Ebro, or else Levante. In 1992 we have no cattle farms observed in levante, the reference 
region is Ebro, or else Levante 
1991 1992 
dep.var. North Center And al. Ebro North (enter And al. Ebro 
Cattle 
Eop -0.046 0.174 -0.029 -0.053 0.139 -0.058 
0.029 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.033 
Ew -0.050 0.165 -0.028 -0.051 0.111 -0.054 
0.028 O.Q28 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.033 
Pig 
Eop -0.056 -0.006 -0.135 -0.084 -0.167 -0.017 -0.101 
0.156 0.038 0.064 0.135 0.125 0.145 0.122 
Ew -0.054 -0.004 -0.133 -0.079 -0.211 -0.069 -0.120 
0.156 0.038 0.065 0.132 0.122 0.141 0.119 
Sheep and Goat 
Eop -0.455 -0.462 -0.459 -0.452 -0.357 -0.342 -0.335 -0.374 
0.169 0.162 0.170 0.162 0.189 0.178 0.181 0.179 
Ew -0.474 -0.472 -0.456 -0.470 -0.378 -0.390 -0.382 -0.399 
0.164 0.158 0.165 0.158 0.183 0.172 0.176 0.174 
the producer may reduce inputs in that proportion while upholding the output level.3 
As the model is nonNparamctric, the estimation of all the above unknown concepts by 
DEA requires to assume convexity and free disposability of inputs and outputs for the pro-
duction possibility set, see Fare, Grosskopf and Love! (1994) for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the characterization of the technology. So the estimate of equation (Al) under 
the least restrictive returns to scale assumption (i.e. variable returns4) for a sample of n 
producers is: 
iiJ = /(x,y) E mP+q: 
n 
x > "y·x· -L- I I• 
i=1 
n 
y~ LYiYi· 
i=l 
n 
LY; = 1, 
i=l 
Vyi :>: 0). (AS) 
where: Yi is the intensity vector of firm i and it defines its best practice or benchmark {inn 
by a linear combination of all the firms observed in the sample. Note that here we are 
using (x, y) as a context variable and not with the same meaning as in Section 6 above. 
3 Alternatively, one could formulate (A3) to (A4) as an output oriented problem. However, in practice, 
the interpretation is then often more complicated, in particular considering how to include direct 
payments in the production function. 
4 The assumption of variable returns to scale is suitable when not all firms are operating at the 
optimal scale and it ensures that an inefficient firm is only "benchmarkcd" against firms of similar 
size. 
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TCabpl~ A7 Estimates (upper .line~) with standard error (lower lines) for the regional effects after 
A 92. The-reference reg1on IS Levante 
1999 2000 
North (enter Andal. Ebro North (enter And al. Ebro 
Cattle 
Eop -0.462 -0.219 -0.376 -0.491 -0.419 -0.179 -0.359 -0.407 
0.104 0.104 0.115 0.106 0.089 0.089 0.100 0.091 
Ew -0.467 -0.254 -0.330 -0.506 -0.423 -0.200 -0.342 -0.403 
0.102 0.102 0.113 0.104 0.088 0.088 0.099 0.090 
Pig 
EoP -0.346 -0.061 0.083 -0.093 -0.033 -0.016 0.208 -0.046 
0.158 0.045 0.083 0.037 0.110 0.058 0.091 0.047 
Ew -0.215 -0.016 0.123 -0.041 -0.095 -0.020 0.057 -0.043 
0.157 0.045 0.083 0.037 0.104 0.055 0.086 0.044 
Sheep and Goat 
EoP -0.120 -0.023 -0.090 -0.138 -0.105 -0.073 -0.232 -0.216 
0.064 0.041 0.055 0.045 0.051 0.030 0.037 0.034 
Ew -0.146 -0.033 -0.099 -0.185 -0.097 -0.067 -0.218 -0.263 
0.059 0.038 0.051 0.042 0.049 0.029 0.035 0.033 
Equally, estimates of equations (A2) and (A3) are then 
X(y) = {x E vf I (x,y) E .V}. .5X(y) = {x E X(y) 1 ex <t X(y) • '18 < 1), (A6) 
while the efficiency measure (equation A4) is estimated by linear programming techniques 
as follows: 
n n n 
B(xi, Yj) = min{8: L yixi ~ Ox; ' Y;::: Lr;Y;. LY;=l. \fyi?:: 0). (A7) 
i=l i=1 i=l 
Firm i is technically efficient if and only if 8(x;, Y;) = 1 and it is located on the frontier 
while a value as 8(x
1
, Y;) < 1 means that the firm is inefficient and is located under the 
frontier. Technical efficiency is then calculated for each unit without needing to specify a 
particular functional form for the production frontier, though the main withdraw of the 
method is the absence of a random error term in the estimation. ln any case, and under 
some regularity assumptions on the data generating process, DEA provides consistent 
estimation of all the above concepts (see Kneip, A., L. Simar and P. Wilson (2003) for 
a review of DEA statistical properties). 
Regression analysis 
As mentioned in the main text, we do not want to assume any particular functional fnrm 
on g(·, ·) except that it is a smooth function, i.e. has continuous second derivatives. 
We explain the estimation of the parameters {3 and the asymprotic covariancc of the esti-
mators, as well as the estimation of the non-parametric function of g(·, ·)in a semi para-
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metric model of the form as described in equation (1), We assume E[e!EF, ESU, R] = 0, 
Var[e] < oo. The estimation of g(·) and fJ will be made in two steps: first the estimation 
of fJ and its covariance using the method of Robinson (1988), and afterwards the esti-
mation of g(·, ·)using local linear smoothing by Ruppert and Wand (1994). For a more 
detailed introduction to non- and semi-parametric modelling see also Hiirdle, MUller, 
Sperlich, and Werwatz (2004). 
The basic idea is to construct an estimator that gives simply a smooth surface (or hyper-
plane), e.g. in the one dimensional case a smooth line, that fits best into the point cloud of 
real observations. The smoothness of that surface can be (pre-) determined by choosing 
a respectively large smoothing parameter h, called bandwidth. Actually, this parameter 
can also often be data driven. 
First, it is important to understand that this estimator works locally, e.g. we estimate the 
desired function, the hyper-plane, separately at each point we are interested in. Therefore 
we need to introduce some additional notations. Consider for a moment a regression 
problem of the form E[YIX = xo] = G(xo), yE m ,X, X E ~ld with G(·) : md -> m 
being an unknown smooth function. Imagine we aim to estimate G(x0) for some point 
xo E md. Having observed lXj, Y;}j==l 'this can be done by local least squares: 
( 
G(xo) ) . ~! T j2 VG(x) = argmm L.. Y; -a0 -a1 (X; -x0) Kh(X; -x0), 0 aD,al i=l (AS) 
a0 Em, a1 E md and VG(-) being the gradient of G(·). Further, Kh(v) = nt~l tK(t) is 
a md -> m weight function. In our calculations we chose K(v) = H(l- J-)2 n {I vi :" 1). 
So we used a weighted least squares estimator for linear regression that becomes a local 
{linear) estimator due to the weights Kh giving a lot of weight to points (X;, Y;) where X; 
is close to x0 but zero weights to points far from x 0 . Consistency, asymptotic theory and 
properties are well known and studied for the multivariate case in Ruppert and Wand 
(1994). For a general introduction see Fan and Gijbcls (1996). 
If we eliminate the vector a1 in equation (A8) and thus maximize only over a0 , the min· 
imizing argument is a local constant estimator of G(x
0
).ln this case it is easy to give the 
explicit formula: 
l:i~l Kh (X;- xo) Y; 
G(x0) = L:i~1 Kh (X;- xo) (A9) 
As one can see, in the weighting function, the smoothing parameter h comes in: the larger 
the h, and consequently the environment with positive weighting, the smoother the result-
ing hyper-plane {i.e. h ~ oo gives a linear function for G whereas h = 0 yields a G being 
the interpolation of the Y. 's). In a context such as ours the choice of the smoothing 
I ' 
parameter should be considered as degrees of freedom which would be chosen, i.e. the 
empi~ical researcher would allow for more flexibility or impose more smoothness on its 
functions. To allow for high flexibility without increasing the variance to unreasonable 
levels, we chose smoothing parameters that did not restrict the functional forms unless 
the plotted surface became wiggly. 
Coming back to our model (1), we will apply the local linear estimation method, i.e. equa-
tion (A8), on (W,. := (ln(EF.), ln(ESU.)), (E.- {3-R.))m 
1 
The remaining question is how 
I I I 1 I=' 
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to get ~. The estimator of f3 is defined as 
• 1 
{J = S - -S - -R-R,R-R R-R,E-E (AIO) 
where for any matrix or vector sequences R., B. we set SR 8 = 1 "~ 1 R.BT and R.. = ..-.. ~ ....... I 1 • n L1::= I I 1 
E[R;]W;J, B; ~ E[Bi\Wi] with B; being either R; or Ei. We estimate the conditional 
expectations {£) via local constant smoother as defined in the equation {A9). It is easy 
to see that the variance of~ can be estimated by &2 S.1 _ _ with &2 being a consistent 
R-R,R-R 
estimator of the conditional variance of E: a 2 = Var[E\Wi, Ri]. For more derails see 
Robinson (1988). 
Furthermore, note that as g(·, ·)is non~parametric, we could have directly used the co-
variates ESU and EF in the model (1). As mentioned above, the logarithm therefore does 
not impose any model specification here, The problem is that both variables have a rather 
skewed distribution with many data-sparse areas. In contrast, ln(ESU) as well as ln(EF) 
look quite normal around the mode with rather short tails at the end. It is thus only for 
the sake of a reasonable behavior of our smoothing techniques that we prefer to apply our 
smoothing methods on the log-transformed data, see also Biedermann and Derte (2003) 
for more details. 
In non- and semi-parametric regression, the choice of smoothness controlled via the band-
width {named h in Section 4.) and chosen by the empirical researcher, is often either not 
discussed or quite controversial. Therefore, we tried out several bandwidths and present 
here the results for those where the estimated surface starts to become smooth. In practice, 
for tvvo dimensions and smooth densities as we have in this application, this provides a 
reasonable trade-off between bias and variance of the estimates. For the parametric part 
fJ of model {1) it should be emphasized that the results for the {semi-) parametric estima-
tion of the regional dummies turned out to be quite robust with respect to the bandwidth 
choice for the non-parametric part. This is expected if for example the regional dummies 
are almost uncorrelated with the other covariates {ln(£SU) and ln(Ef) in our case). More 
details on the methodology are available on request. 
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